Playbook创业剧本

Bible for startups

正文原作者:Sam Altman
翻译:梅晨斐任宁

We spend a lot of time advising startups. Though one-on-one advice will
always be crucial, we thought it might help us scale Y Combinator if we
could distill the most generalizable parts of this advice into a sort of
we could give YC and YC Fellowship companies.
我们开销了许多的日子为创业公司提供咨询指出。固然我们很了解一对一的门类提议直接格外首要,但大家同样认为假诺能够把拥有提议中的共性部分提取出来,以某种“剧本”的体裁给到YC内部协会YC所有投资的商家,将会对Y
Combinator未来的开拓进取格外有援救

Then we thought we should just give it to everyone.
后来大家认为应该把那么些情节公开给所有人。

This is meant for people new to the world of startups. Most of this will
not be new to people who have read a lot of what YC partners have
written—the goal is to get it into one place.
对此开头跻身创业世界的新手们的话,它将很有含义。对于那多少个平时翻阅YC合伙人小说的人来说,里面半数以上情节恐怕早已很熟知。但本文的目的是将有所有关的提出会聚到一头。

There may be a part II on how to scale a startup later—this mostly
covers how to start one.
未来将会有第二部分篇章,聚焦于创业集团怎么着高效成长。本篇为第一有些,涉及什么建立一家创业公司。

Your goal as a startup is to make something users love. If you do that,
then you have to figure out how to get a lot more users. But this first
part is critical—think about the really successful companies of today.
They all started with a product that their early users loved so much
they told other people about it. If you fail to do this, you will fail.
If you deceive yourself and think your users love your product when they
don’t, you will still fail.
创业公司的紧要性目标是创制出用户喜爱的制品。如果你已经形成了这一步,接下去要想想的就是什么收获越多用户。可是那首先步分外重大,想一想今天那多少个伟大的公司呢。那一个集团的天使用户都极度喜爱它们在启动时推出的出品,以至于会自发推荐给身边的恋人们。假若你没能做到那或多或少,你的制品以后不会中标。借使你欺骗自己并且固执地以为你的用户喜爱你的成品(而实际他们并没有),你照旧将会破产。

The startup graveyard is littered with people who thought they could
skip this step.
创业项目的墓地里散落着那些自认为可以跳过第一步的创业者和创业项目的名字。

It’s much better to first make a product a small number of users love
than a product that a large number of users like. Even though the total
amount of positive feeling is the same, it’s much easier to get more
users than to go from like to love.
更好的做法是,做一款能让一小部分用户“热爱”的产品,而不只是被一大群人仅仅“喜欢”而已。或许对你的话,那二种艺术带给产品团队总的正面意义没什么分化。但从产品将来的向上来看,被一小部分人“热爱”的出品会比被一群人“喜欢”的成品,发展的征程要轻松得多。

A word of warning about choosing to start a startup: It sucks! One of
the most consistent pieces of feedback we get from YC founders is it’s
harder than they could have ever imagined, because they didn’t have a
framework for the sort of work and intensity a startup entails. Joining
an early-stage startup that’s on a rocketship trajectory is usually a
much better financial deal.
假设要给那些正在考虑是还是不是要创业的人一个词来形容创业的感觉,这就是:“糟糕透顶”。大家从所有YC创办人那里得到的一条共性的报告意见就是,创业是一件比你所能想象的愈加不方便的作业。因为你不可能准确的算出一家创业公司索要做到的工作量和做事强度。加入一家已经步入上涨轨道的最初创业集团,从财务角度考虑或者是一个更好的操纵。

On the other hand, starting a startup is not in fact very risky to your
career—if you’re really good at technology, there will be job
opportunities if you fail. Most people are very bad at evaluating risk.
I personally think the riskier option is having an idea or project
you’re really passionate about and working at a safe, easy, unfulfilling
job instead.
换个角度来说,创立一家创业公司对您的职业生涯来说并从未专门大的风险。倘使你有很强的技术实力,尽管你的创业项目战败了,找一份其他的技术工作并不困难。一大半人都不太会去评估风险。从本人个人的角度看,拗不过于一个安然无恙、轻松、不带来成就感的干活,而不去从事自己的确保养的创意或项目,反而是件高风险更大的事务。

To have a successful startup, you need: a great idea (including a great
market), a great team, a great product, and great execution.
为了完结一家成功的创业公司,你需求:一个壮烈的想法(和一个足足大的市场),一个高大的集体,一款伟大的制品和超绝的执行力。

THE IDEA创意

One of the first things we ask YC companies is what they’re building and
why.
大家会问所有YC创业公司的首先个问题是,他们的制品是何许,以及为啥想做这件事。

We look for clear, concise answers here. This is both to evaluate you as
a founder and the idea itself. It’s important to be able to think and
communicate clearly as a founder—you’ll need it for recruiting, raising
money, selling, etc. Ideas in general need to be clear to spread, and
complex ideas are almost always a sign of muddled thinking or a made up
problem. If the idea does not really excite at least some people the
first time they hear it, that’s bad.
咱俩盼望肯定、简洁的答应。这一个问题是为着评估创业想法,也是为了评估开创者本身。作为一名开创者,你的盘算能力和表明能力是如出一辙主要的,在选聘、融资、销售等环节都会必要。创业想法日常来说需求充足简洁,那样会不难传唱。复杂或不便表明清楚的创业想法平时代表了歪曲的想想,或者自己就是一个伪需要。假诺当别人首先次听到你的创业想法却并从未显示出欢欣的话,那是一个坏新闻。

Another thing we ask is who desperately needs the product.
俺们还会问,哪些用户会卓殊想要你的制品。

In the best case, you yourself are the target user. In the second best
case, you understand the target user extremely well.If a company already
has users, we ask how many and how fast that number is growing. We try
to figure out why it’s not growing faster, and we especially try to
figure out if users really love the product. Usually this means they’re
telling their friends to use the product without prompting from the
company. We also ask if the company is generating revenue, and if not,
why not.
最美妙的情事下,你协调就是目的用户。次一级的景况是,你不行明白目的用户的须要。借使项目已经有一对用户基数,大家会了然用户的增强景况和增进速度。大家会尝试去找出用户没有神速增进的来头,并且专程想弄通晓用户是不是确实热爱那款产品。寻常情状下一旦用户真正心爱产品,在公司尚未积极性加大的景观下也会再接再砺和身边的爱人推荐那款产品。大家一样也会询问集团是还是不是已经发现身金流,假使没有的话,为啥。

If the company doesn’t yet have users, we try to figure out the minimum
thing to build first to test the hypothesis—i.e., if we work backwards
from the perfect experience, we try to figure out what kernel to start
with.如若如今还没有用户,大家会想办法建立最小的主旋律产品去测试大家的比方——也就从产品将来最健全的模样往回倒推,尝试去找到万分最初始最要旨的基石。

The way to test an idea is to either launch it and see what happens or
try to sell it (e.g. try to get a letter of intent before you write a
line of code.) The former works better for consumer ideas (users may
tell you they will use it, but in practice it won’t cut through the
clutter) and the latter works better for enterprise ideas (if a company
tells you they will buy something, then go build it.) Specifically, if
you are an enterprise company, one of the first questions we’ll ask you
is if you have a letter of intent from a customer saying they’ll buy
what you’re building. For most biotech and hard tech companies, the way
to test an idea is to first talk to potential customers and then figure
out the smallest subset of the technology you can build first.It’s
important to let your idea evolve as you get feedback from users. And
it’s critical you understand your users really well—you need this to
evaluate an idea, build a great product, and build a great company.
万一要测试创业想法,你可以赶紧发表产品然后观望用户反映,或者直接销售产品(就像是在写代码前先申明注释)。前一种方法适用于间接面向个人消费者的出品(用户可能会告诉您他们会利用产品,但骨子里并不会真正去做),后一种情势适用于面向公司消费者的产品(借使有协作社客户承诺愿意为您的出品付费,那么你可以出手去做了)。更加是当您的制品面向公司客户时,大家会问的率先个问题是是还是不是已经有客户承诺只要你们的出品发布他们会出资购买。对于一大半的生物科技(science and technology)和硬件科学和技术创业公司来说,测试创业想法的最好解决方案是,先和秘密的客户调换,然后找出可操作的能够化解问题的小小可行性产品。随着你不停赢得用户的汇报,你的想法也要能不断随之形成。精晓你的客户充足首要,那是您评价自己的想法,打造伟大的成品和店家的前提。

As mentioned earlier, startups are really hard. They take a very long
time, and consistent intense effort. The founders and employees need to
have a shared sense of mission to sustain them. So we ask why founders
want to start this particular company.
如上所说,创业的道路万分勤奋。需求长日子,高强度持续的着力。创办人和公司成员须要共享一个骨干的眼光来支持。所以大家会问所有创办人为何想要创制这么一家非凡的店家。

We also ask how the company will one day be a monopoly. There are a lot
of different terms for this, but we use Peter Thiel’s. Obviously, we
don’t want your company to behave in an unethical way against
competitors. Instead, we’re looking for businesses that get more
powerful with scale and that are difficult to copy.
我们同样也会问这家公司将怎样变成一家垄断集团。在那件业务上有许多想方设法百花齐放,不过大家利用彼得(Peter)Thiel的观点。明显的,大家不期望您的商家接纳不正当手段对付你的竞争对手。相反,俺们在物色是那一个随着增添能收获影响力,并且难以复制的商号。

Finally, we ask about the market. We ask how big it is today, how fast
it’s growing, and why it’s going to be big in ten years. We try to
understand why the market is going to grow quickly, and why it’s a good
market for a startup to go after. We like it when major technological
shifts are just starting that most people haven’t realized yet—big
companies are bad at addressing those. And somewhat counterintuitively,
the best answer is going after a large part of a small market.
末尾,我们会精晓市场。大家会问现在市面有多大,拉长的进程怎样,以及为啥在十年过后它将变成一个很大的市场。我们品尝去了解为啥这几个市场将会神速增加,以及为啥那是一个契合创业集团进入的商海。我们期待寓目的是重大的技术转型正在暴发,但是大多数人还并未发觉到。大公司往往很难注意到那几个。而且某种反直觉的意况是,最好的答案是追逐一个光辉市场里的撤并领域。

A few other thoughts on ideas:
任何一些与创业想法有关的是:

We greatly prefer something new to something derivative. Most really big
companies start with something fundamentally new (one acceptable
definition of new is 10x better.) If there are ten other companies
starting at the same time with the same plan, and it sounds a whole lot
like something that already exists, we are skeptical.
对照于拷贝其余种类的创业集团,我们更爱好那多少个负有独创性的信用社。一大半了不起的信用社都是从一个翻新领域的底子起首的(一个足以承受的对于新产品的概念是10倍则更好)。如若已经有10家类似的商家在同一时间使用同样套解决方案盯住同一块市场,并且听上去解决方案与市场上已部分方案相当相像,我们会很猜忌项目标前景。

One important counterintuitive reason for this is that it’s easier to do
something new and hard than something derivative and easy. People will
want to help you and join you if it’s the former; they will not if it’s
the latter.
一个重中之重的反直觉的理由是,
转业于一个立异性的小圈子,比复制一个难度低的产品反而越发简单。即便您从事于一个立异性的天地,人们会更赞成于帮忙你,参加你。

The best ideas sound bad but are in fact good. So you don’t need to be
too secretive with your idea—if it’s actually a good idea, it likely
won’t sound like it’s worth stealing. Even if it does sound like it’s
worth stealing, there are at least a thousand times more people that
have good ideas than people who are willing to do the kind of work it
takes to turn a great idea into a great company. And if you tell people
what you’re doing, they might help.
好的想法早期听上去都是坏点子。之所以对于你的创业想法并非太过保密,假如它实在是一个好的关节,它在初期听上去也不值得被偷。就算那几个问题看上去就很有价值,也只是偶发的人的确愿意出手将巨大的想法变成巨大的创业集团的人。并且只要您告知外人正在致力的品类,他们也许还会辅助你。

Speaking of telling people your idea—while it’s important the idea
really excites some people the first time they hear it, almost everyone
is going to tell you that your idea sucks. Maybe they are right. Maybe
they are not good at evaluating startups, or maybe they are just
jealous. Whatever the reason is, it will happen a lot, it will hurt, and
even if you think you’re not going to be affected by it, you still will
be. The faster you can develop self-belief and not get dragged down too
much by haters, the better off you’ll be. No matter how successful you
are, the haters will never go away.
说到告知别人你的创业想法,能让这多少个第四回听到创业热点的人深感开心是很主要的。但与此同时差不离种种听到你想法的人都会说那是一个不好的主张。也许他们是对的。也许他们并不擅长于评估创业公司,或者他们只是嫉妒。不管是哪一种情景,那会时时暴发,它会加害你,并且就算你自认为不会遭到震慑,它仍旧会贻误你。你能越快地建立起信心,不被那多少个流言所侵害越好。不论是你曾经多么成功,那多少个憎恨你的人不可磨灭不会磨灭。

What if you don’t have an idea but want to start a startup? Maybe you
shouldn’t. It’s so much better if the idea comes first and the startup
is the way to get the idea out into the world.
一经你未曾好的枢纽可是如故想建立一家创业集团怎么做?也许你就不该这样做。更好的做法是,先拥有一个好的纽带,然后通过树立集团把那个点子变成一款实际的制品带到人们眼前。

We once tried an experiment where we funded a bunch of promising
founding teams with no ideas in the hopes they would land on a promising
idea after we funded them.
咱俩早就做过一个测验,投资这些负有潜力不过暂时没有典型的老祖宗们,希望他们在获得大家的钱之后可以想出一些好典型并且付诸达成。

All of them failed. I think part of the problem is that good founders
tend to have lots of good ideas (too many, usually). But an even bigger
problem is that once you have a startup you have to hurry to come up
with an idea, and because it’s already an official company the idea
can’t be too crazy. You end up with plausible sounding but derivative
ideas. This is the danger of pivots.
她们无一例外都未果了。我觉得有些的来头在于好的奠基者倾向于暴发相当多好的症结(往往太多)。但是一个更大的问题是假如公司注册已经到位,你频仍会急于想出一个创业典型。但因为您早就确立了正规化的店家,所以这么些新热点就一再不可以太过疯狂。最终的后果是您取得别人花言巧语的称道,以及一个弱智的枢纽。那是转型的安危。

So it’s better not to try too actively to force yourself to come up with
startup ideas. Instead, learn about a lot of different things. Practice
noticing problems, things that seem inefficient, and major technological
shifts. Work on projects you find interesting. Go out of your way to
hang around smart, interesting people. At some point, ideas will
emerge.
就此更好的方法是无须急于求成逼迫自己想出好的关键。相反,上学许多不比类型的事务。磨练自己观望问题的能力,找出那多少个看上去低效的事体,观察那么些革命性的技能转型从事你感兴趣的品类。跳出你自己的领域,与这些聪敏且有趣的人在一起。不经意间,好的纽带会活动冒出来的。

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