Playbook创业剧本4858美高梅

Bible for startups

正文原小编:Sam Altman
翻译:梅晨斐任宁

We spend a lot of time advising startups. Though one-on-one advice will
always be crucial, we thought it might help us scale Y Combinator if we
could distill the most generalizable parts of this advice into a sort of
we could give YC and YC Fellowship companies.
俺们费用了广大的日子为创业公司提供咨询指出。即使大家很明亮一对一的品种提出直接非常关键,但我们一致觉得只要可以把拥有提出中的共性部分提取出来,以某种“剧本”的体制给到YC内部协会YC所有投资的店家,将会对Y
Combinator未来的提升丰盛有帮带

Then we thought we should just give it to everyone.
此后我们以为应该把这一个情节公开给所有人。

This is meant for people new to the world of startups. Most of this will
not be new to people who have read a lot of what YC partners have
written—the goal is to get it into one place.
对此第一进入创业世界的新手们来说,它将很有含义。对于那几个平时翻阅YC合伙人作品的人的话,里面半数以上情节恐怕早就很熟习。但本文的目标是将持有相关的提议会聚到一道。

There may be a part II on how to scale a startup later—this mostly
covers how to start one.
前景将会有第二有些小说,聚焦于创业公司怎么样连忙成长。本篇为第一局地,涉及什么树立一家创业公司。

Your goal as a startup is to make something users love. If you do that,
then you have to figure out how to get a lot more users. But this first
part is critical—think about the really successful companies of today.
They all started with a product that their early users loved so much
they told other people about it. If you fail to do this, you will fail.
If you deceive yourself and think your users love your product when they
don’t, you will still fail.
创业公司的第一目标是打造出用户喜爱的产品。即使您曾经到位了这一步,接下去要寻思的就是怎么获取越多用户。可是那首先步格外首要,想一想后天那么些伟大的商家吧。那个店铺的天使用户都不行热衷它们在起步时推出的出品,以至于会自发推荐给身边的意中人们。如果你没能做到那或多或少,你的制品未来不会水到渠成。如若你欺骗自己同时固执地认为你的用户喜爱你的成品(而实质上他们并从未),你依旧将会失利。

The startup graveyard is littered with people who thought they could
skip this step.
创业项目标墓地里散落着那多少个自以为可以跳过第一步的创业者和创业项目标名字。

It’s much better to first make a product a small number of users love
than a product that a large number of users like. Even though the total
amount of positive feeling is the same, it’s much easier to get more
users than to go from like to love.
更好的做法是,做一款能让一小部分用户“热爱”的出品,而不只是被一大群人仅仅“喜欢”而已。或许对您的话,这二种方法带给产品团队总的正面意义没什么差异。但从产品以后的前进来看,被一小部分人“热爱”的制品会比被一群人“喜欢”的出品,发展的征途要轻松得多。

A word of warning about choosing to start a startup: It sucks! One of
the most consistent pieces of feedback we get from YC founders is it’s
harder than they could have ever imagined, because they didn’t have a
framework for the sort of work and intensity a startup entails. Joining
an early-stage startup that’s on a rocketship trajectory is usually a
much better financial deal.
若果要给那几个正在考虑是或不是要创业的人一个词来描写创业的感觉,那就是:“不好透顶”。大家从所有YC创办者那里获取的一条共性的反映意见就是,创业是一件比你所能想象的尤其困难的政工。因为您不可能精确的算出一家创业公司索要做到的工作量和劳作强度。参预一家曾经步入回涨轨道的最初创业公司,从财务角度考虑或者是一个更好的控制。

On the other hand, starting a startup is not in fact very risky to your
career—if you’re really good at technology, there will be job
opportunities if you fail. Most people are very bad at evaluating risk.
I personally think the riskier option is having an idea or project
you’re really passionate about and working at a safe, easy, unfulfilling
job instead.
换个角度来说,制造一家创业集团对您的职业生涯来说并从未专门大的风险。借使您有很强的技术实力,即便你的创业项目失败了,找一份其余的技巧工作并不困难。一大半人都不太会去评估风险。从自己个人的角度看,拗可是于一个安全、轻松、不带来成就感的行事,而不去从事自己确实心爱的新意或项目,反而是件高风险更大的事体。

To have a successful startup, you need: a great idea (including a great
market), a great team, a great product, and great execution.
为了完毕一家成功的创业公司,你要求:一个伟大的想法(和一个丰盛大的商海),一个高大的公司,一款伟大的产品和卓绝的执行力。

THE IDEA创意

One of the first things we ask YC companies is what they’re building and
why.
咱俩会问所有YC创业公司的首先个问题是,他们的出品是何许,以及为啥想做那件事。

We look for clear, concise answers here. This is both to evaluate you as
a founder and the idea itself. It’s important to be able to think and
communicate clearly as a founder—you’ll need it for recruiting, raising
money, selling, etc. Ideas in general need to be clear to spread, and
complex ideas are almost always a sign of muddled thinking or a made up
problem. If the idea does not really excite at least some people the
first time they hear it, that’s bad.
我们期望肯定、简洁的应对。这么些题材是为了评估创业想法,也是为着评估开创者本身。作为一名创办者,你的思辨能力和表达能力是相同主要的,在招聘、融资、销售等环节都会须求。创业想法日常来说须求万分简单,那样会不难传播。复杂或难以发挥清楚的创业想法平时代表了模糊的思想,或者自身就是一个伪须要。若是当别人首先次听到你的创业想法却并没有显现出喜悦的话,那是一个坏音讯。

Another thing we ask is who desperately needs the product.
咱俩还会问,哪些用户会分外想要你的产品。

In the best case, you yourself are the target user. In the second best
case, you understand the target user extremely well.If a company already
has users, we ask how many and how fast that number is growing. We try
to figure out why it’s not growing faster, and we especially try to
figure out if users really love the product. Usually this means they’re
telling their friends to use the product without prompting from the
company. We also ask if the company is generating revenue, and if not,
why not.
最优质的景色下,你自己就是目的用户。次一流的图景是,你相当驾驭目的用户的须求。假使项目曾经有一些用户基数,大家会通晓用户的增加情形和增进速度。大家会尝试去找出用户并未快捷拉长的原由,并且特意想弄通晓用户是不是真的热爱那款产品。经常境况下如若用户真正爱护产品,在商店没有积极性加大的图景下也会再接再砺和身边的敌人推荐那款产品。大家一致也会明白店家是不是已经爆发现金流,倘使没有的话,为何。

If the company doesn’t yet have users, we try to figure out the minimum
thing to build first to test the hypothesis—i.e., if we work backwards
from the perfect experience, we try to figure out what kernel to start
with.即使如今还没有用户,大家会想方法建立最小的来头产品去测试大家的比方——也就从成品以后最完美的外貌往回倒推,尝试去找到卓殊最起首最基本的木本。

The way to test an idea is to either launch it and see what happens or
try to sell it (e.g. try to get a letter of intent before you write a
line of code.) The former works better for consumer ideas (users may
tell you they will use it, but in practice it won’t cut through the
clutter) and the latter works better for enterprise ideas (if a company
tells you they will buy something, then go build it.) Specifically, if
you are an enterprise company, one of the first questions we’ll ask you
is if you have a letter of intent from a customer saying they’ll buy
what you’re building. For most biotech and hard tech companies, the way
to test an idea is to first talk to potential customers and then figure
out the smallest subset of the technology you can build first.It’s
important to let your idea evolve as you get feedback from users. And
it’s critical you understand your users really well—you need this to
evaluate an idea, build a great product, and build a great company.
万一要测试创业想法,你能够尽快发表产品然后观看用户反映,或者直接销售产品(就像在写代码前先评释注释)。前一种格局适用于间接面向个人消费者的产品(用户可能会报告您他们会利用产品,但骨子里并不会真的去做),后一种方法适用于面向集团消费者的出品(假如有商家客户承诺愿意为你的制品付费,那么您能够出手去做了)。更加是当您的出品面向公司客户时,大家会问的第二个问题是是或不是早已有客户承诺一旦你们的产品揭橥他们会掏钱购买。对于一大半的生物科学和技术和硬件科技(science and technology)创业企业来说,测试创业想法的最好解决方案是,先和神秘的客户沟通,然后找出可操作的能够解决问题的细小可行性产品。随着你不停得到用户的反映,你的想法也要能不断随之形成。领悟您的客户尤其紧要,那是你评价自己的想法,打造伟大的成品和商社的前提。

As mentioned earlier, startups are really hard. They take a very long
time, and consistent intense effort. The founders and employees need to
have a shared sense of mission to sustain them. So we ask why founders
want to start this particular company.
如上所说,创业的道路至极劳碌。需求长日子,高强度持续的努力。创办者和团体成员需求共享一个主导的见识来帮衬。所以我们会问所有开创者为何想要创建这么一家格外的商家。

We also ask how the company will one day be a monopoly. There are a lot
of different terms for this, but we use Peter Thiel’s. Obviously, we
don’t want your company to behave in an unethical way against
competitors. Instead, we’re looking for businesses that get more
powerful with scale and that are difficult to copy.
大家一样也会问这家商店将怎样变成一家垄断公司。在那件业务上有许多想法百花齐放,然则大家选拔彼得Thiel的观点。明显的,我们不希望您的合作社拔取不正当手段对付你的竞争对手。相反,大家在寻觅是那多少个随着扩充能博取影响力,并且难以复制的店堂。

Finally, we ask about the market. We ask how big it is today, how fast
it’s growing, and why it’s going to be big in ten years. We try to
understand why the market is going to grow quickly, and why it’s a good
market for a startup to go after. We like it when major technological
shifts are just starting that most people haven’t realized yet—big
companies are bad at addressing those. And somewhat counterintuitively,
the best answer is going after a large part of a small market.
终极,大家会询问市场。我们会问现在市面有多大,拉长的进程如何,以及为什么在十年之后它将变成一个很大的商海。大家尝试去领略为何这么些市场将会迅速增进,以及为什么那是一个契合创业公司进入的商海。大家期待观察标是器重的技巧转型正在爆发,但是大多数人还尚未察觉到。大公司往往很难注意到那些。而且某种反直觉的景观是,最好的答案是追逐一个宏大市场里的细分领域。

A few other thoughts on ideas:
其它一些与创业想法有关的是:

We greatly prefer something new to something derivative. Most really big
companies start with something fundamentally new (one acceptable
definition of new is 10x better.) If there are ten other companies
starting at the same time with the same plan, and it sounds a whole lot
like something that already exists, we are skeptical.
相比较于拷贝其余品类的创业公司,大家更欣赏那一个拥有独创性的商家。一大半壮烈的公司都是从一个立异领域的根底初叶的(一个方可接受的对于新产品的概念是10倍则更好)。倘使已经有10家类似的店堂在同一时间使用同样套解决方案盯住同一块市场,并且听上去化解方案与市面上已有些方案丰硕相像,大家会很猜疑项目标前景。

One important counterintuitive reason for this is that it’s easier to do
something new and hard than something derivative and easy. People will
want to help you and join you if it’s the former; they will not if it’s
the latter.
一个生死攸关的反直觉的说辞是,
从业于一个革新性的世界,比复制一个难度低的制品反而越发不难。借使你从事于一个立异性的天地,人们会更赞成于接济您,加入你。

The best ideas sound bad but are in fact good. So you don’t need to be
too secretive with your idea—if it’s actually a good idea, it likely
won’t sound like it’s worth stealing. Even if it does sound like it’s
worth stealing, there are at least a thousand times more people that
have good ideas than people who are willing to do the kind of work it
takes to turn a great idea into a great company. And if you tell people
what you’re doing, they might help.
好的想法早期听上去都是坏点子。于是对于你的创业想法并非太过保密,如若它的确是一个好的节骨眼,它在最初听上去也不值得被偷。纵然这么些热点看上去就很有价值,也只是百年不遇的人确实愿意下手将高大的想法变成巨大的创业公司的人。并且只要您告知外人正在从事的花色,他们恐怕还会支援您。

Speaking of telling people your idea—while it’s important the idea
really excites some people the first time they hear it, almost everyone
is going to tell you that your idea sucks. Maybe they are right. Maybe
they are not good at evaluating startups, or maybe they are just
jealous. Whatever the reason is, it will happen a lot, it will hurt, and
even if you think you’re not going to be affected by it, you still will
be. The faster you can develop self-belief and not get dragged down too
much by haters, the better off you’ll be. No matter how successful you
are, the haters will never go away.
说到告知别人你的创业想法,能让那一个第四回听到创业热点的人感到快乐是很要紧的。但与此同时大概各类听到你想法的人都会说那是一个不好的意见。也许他们是对的。也许他们并不擅长于评估创业公司,或者他们只是嫉妒。不管是哪一类意况,那会通常暴发,它会挫伤你,并且固然你自认为不见面临震慑,它照旧会损害你。你能越快地树立起信心,不被那多少个流言所侵凌越好。随便你早就多么成功,那么些憎恨你的人永远不会消亡。

What if you don’t have an idea but want to start a startup? Maybe you
shouldn’t. It’s so much better if the idea comes first and the startup
is the way to get the idea out into the world.
万一您从未好的热点可是如故想建立一家创业公司如何做?也许你就不该这么做。更好的做法是,先拥有一个好的关节,然后通过创建合作社把那一个点子变成一款实际的成品带到人们眼前。

We once tried an experiment where we funded a bunch of promising
founding teams with no ideas in the hopes they would land on a promising
idea after we funded them.
俺们早已做过一个考试,投资这个拥有潜力可是暂风尚未问题的元老们,希望她们在获得大家的钱之后可以想出部分好典型并且付诸落成。

All of them failed. I think part of the problem is that good founders
tend to have lots of good ideas (too many, usually). But an even bigger
problem is that once you have a startup you have to hurry to come up
with an idea, and because it’s already an official company the idea
can’t be too crazy. You end up with plausible sounding but derivative
ideas. This is the danger of pivots.
她们无一例外都未果了。我觉得有些的缘故在于好的祖师爷倾向于发生分外多好的点子(往往太多)。可是一个更大的题材是假使公司登记已经形成,你往往会急于想出一个创业典型。但因为你已经创立了正式的店堂,所以那么些新典型就屡次不可能太过疯狂。最终的结果是您拿走旁人花言巧语的表扬,以及一个弱智的要害。这是转型的危殆。

So it’s better not to try too actively to force yourself to come up with
startup ideas. Instead, learn about a lot of different things. Practice
noticing problems, things that seem inefficient, and major technological
shifts. Work on projects you find interesting. Go out of your way to
hang around smart, interesting people. At some point, ideas will
emerge.
据此更好的章程是毫无急于逼迫自己想出好的典型。相反,上学许多不一品类的业务。磨炼自己观看问题的能力,找出那多少个看上去低效的事情,寓目那多少个革命性的技巧转型转业你感兴趣的品种。跳出你自己的天地,与那一个聪敏且有趣的人在一块。不经意间,好的要害会自动冒出来的。

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